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Abstract: the principle of organic unities is a metaphysical claim regarding 
the nature of moral value. It states that the value of the whole is not equal to 
the summation of its parts. I wish to consider this principle in relation to the 
problem of God and evil and claim that the theist can utilize the principle of 
organic unities to undermine the problem of evil. First, I explain the 
principle of organic unities and how it affects one’s understanding of moral 
value. Next, I explicate the two major historical versions of the problem of 
evil: the logical argument from evil and the evidential argument from evil. 
Lastly, I argue that the principle of organic unities demonstrates that God 
may logically co–exist with evil and that the atheist lacks rational warrant 
appealing to gratuitous evil against God’s existence. As a result, both 
problems fail. 
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The problem of evil is quite possibly the greatest weapon used by atheists against 
belief in God, particularly the Christian God. The problem of evil, in all of its 
variants, exploits the existence of evil as a reason to reject the existence of God. 
While much ink has been spilled defining and responding to the problem of evil, 
the issue remains a dynamic force in the philosophy of religion as well as religious 
apologetics. I argue, however, that the problem of evil fails. I claim that the theist 
can utilize the metaphysics of value and value possession to undermine the 
problem of evil. The metaphysical principle that I have in mind is the principle of 
organic unities.1 First, I explain the principle of organic unities and how it affects 
                                                 
1The concept of organic unities is similar to arguments regarding the existence of evil and God in 
the form of the greater good theodicy. This theodicy claims that God permits evil to exist either to 
obtain a greater good or to avoid a worse evil. In Meditations 4, Rene Descartes (1998), for example, 
argues that he is subject to error in his mental abilities, and God could have created him without 
that penchant for error. Descartes, however, concludes that the world as a whole might be more 
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one’s understanding of the nature of moral value as well as the assertion of value. 
Next, I explicate two major versions of the problem of evil: the logical argument 
from evil and the evidential argument from evil. The logical argument from evil 
attempts to show that God’s existence is logically incompatible with the existence 
of evil. The evidential argument attempts to show that the existence of gratuitous 
and pointless evil is a reason to reject the existence of God. Lastly, I argue that the 
principle of organic unities demonstrates that God may logically co–exist with evil 
and that the atheist lacks evidence to which he may appeal to provide rational 
warrant against God’s existence. As a result, both problems of evil fail. 
 
1. The Principle of Organic Unities 
 
Theism faces a pernicious problem from the existence of evil. The mere existence of 
evil is supposedly incompatible with the existence of such a God leading to the 
conclusion that theism is irrational. With this issue in mind, I wish to examine a 
concept that I believe leads both the logical argument from evil and the evidential 
argument from evil to falter. The concept I have in mind is the principle of organic 
unities. Organic unities are wholes (objects or states of affairs) that have good, bad, 
or indifferent valued parts. These parts contribute to the existence of the whole but 
do not determine the value of the whole. As a result, the value of a whole bears no 
regular proportion to the sum of its parts; therefore, an organic whole may have 
bad or indifferent parts but still possess the value of goodness. 
While the principle of organic unities has links back to ancient Greek 
philosophy, Franz Brentano and G. E. Moore are the first to formally define the 
principle as it is known today. As interpreted by Roderick Chisholm (1986), 
                                                                                                                                                    
perfect as it is with this possibility for error than if it did not. Gottfried Leibniz (1990, 2005) 
famously argues that God must and has created the best possible world; therefore, the evil the 
actual world contains is justified. Each philosopher is claiming that the combination of certain good 
and bad parts produces a whole that is greater in goodness than not having the evil parts and 
which justifies the evil. Another similar kind of argument is that evil is necessary to obtaining 
certain good things or states of affairs. These types of arguments ultimately may not differ from the 
greater goods theodicy. For examples, see John Hick (1966) and Richard Swinburne (1996). My 
argument, however, makes no appeal to obtaining greater goods or avoiding worse evils as a 
means of justifying God. I claim merely that the principle of organic unities implies certain 
metaphysical truths about the possession of moral value that affect the co–existence of God and evil 
as well as the possible existence of gratuitous evil that allow the theist to reject both problems of 
evil. The argument also does not appeal to any particular good thing as the reason for God 
permitting evil. Further, these arguments appear to imply a mean–end relationship between evil 
and good things or states of affairs. The principle of organic unities, as will be seen, rejects the 
notion that evil parts are a means to a good whole.  
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Brentano noted that goodness is not merely a function of the value of the parts of 
the whole. Goodness lies in the order that the parts exhibit within the whole. This 
claim is exhibited three ways. First, the principle of bonum variationis states that all 
things being equal it is better to combine two dissimilar goods that two equal 
goods. Combining two different goods that have the same value (a beautiful 
painting and a beautiful piece of music) is better than having two goods of the 
same value (two beautiful paintings). Variety is better than uniformity. Second, the 
principle of bonum progressionis states that for two similar situations A and B if the 
amount of goodness increases in A but decreases in B, then A is preferable to B 
even if their value ultimately is equal. It is better to increase goodness than to 
decrease it, to go from good to better than to go from better to just good. Third, the 
law of retribution states that the sorrow that is involved in punishment or remorse 
when combined with an evil act is better than the lack of sorrow. Though sorrow is 
bad, it is better that sorrow exist as punishment or remorse alongside an evil act 
than that it be absent with the evil act.  
These principles are all contrary to the principle of summation Chisholm states. 
The principle of summation claims that the value of the parts outweighs or 
counterbalances the value of the other parts. The two paintings and the piece of 
music all have the same value. According to the principle of summation, the 
combination of either painting with the piece of music has the same value as the 
combination of the two paintings. The principle of bonum variationis claims that this 
conclusion is false. It is better to have a variety of good things than to lack or miss 
out on other goods; however, this greater value cannot be obtained simply by 
adding the value of the parts of the whole. This value is obtained only through the 
relation that the parts have with each other. The relation shared between the 
painting and the piece of music confers a greater value due to one having a variety 
of things rather than two of the same thing. The same conclusion follows with the 
principle of bonum progressionis. Even though the sum of the parts of A and B are 
equal, it is better to increase goodness than to decrease it. Due to this relation 
between the parts, A (painting, music) is intrinsically better than B (two paintings) 
because A increases in goodness (variety). Lastly, this conclusion is upheld by the 
law of retribution. The sum of an evil action along with sorrow is certainly bad, but 
if that sorrow comes from remorse or punishment, the combination of the evil act 
and sorrow can actually be good or better than the evil that is not punished. Evil 
should never go unpunished, and one should always feel remorse over doing evil. 
Thus, the principle of summation is false and not a valid means to determine the 
value of a whole. The number of good or bad things in a whole does not 
necessarily determine the value of the whole. 
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As Moore claims, it is plausible for one to assert any of the following: (i) that the 
combination of two good things lead to a greater value; (ii) that the combination of 
two bad things lead to a worse value; (iii) that the combination of a good and an 
indifferent thing leads to a greater value; (iv) that the combination of a bad and 
indifferent thing leads to worse value; (v) that the combination of two indifferent 
things leads to either greater or worse value. On the other hand, asserting that the 
combination of a bad and a good part leads to greater value or that two bad things 
leads to a whole with greater value is difficult, but not impossible (Moore, 2004). 
Noah Lemos (1994) argues that righteous indignation is an instance of organic 
unities that combine good and evil parts to create a good whole.2 Events, such as 
World War II with its quest to stop Nazi aggression, could be an example of an 
organic unity that is good on the whole but contains evil parts depending on one’s 
beliefs concerning the morality of war. Farming and hunting are something that 
could be considered a good organic unity with evil parts with the survival of 
human life due to the death of plant and animal life. Brentano’s law of retribution 
is also a possible example of how evil parts can combine to form a good whole; 
therefore, there is reason to believe that organic unities of all kinds are not only 
logically possible but also that they do in fact exist. 
As Moore (2004) further explains, the concept of an organic whole is different 
from the concept of a means to an end in three ways. First, the existence of any 
such part of an organic unity is a necessary condition for the existence of the good 
constituted by the whole. The means is not part of the end, but the part is part of 
the whole. As a result, the end may exist without the means and still be a good 
end, but the whole may not exist without the part and still be a good whole. The 
means has no intrinsic value, but the part does have such a value which relates to 
the value of the whole. The whole is connected to the part by a metaphysical 
relation while the means is connected to the end by a causal relation. Second, the 
part has no more value when it is a part of one or another whole. The value of the 
part does not change according to the whole to which it belongs. The value of the 
part remains constant no matter to which whole it belongs.  This claim is not true 
                                                 
2Lemos notes that there are six examples of organic unities: (i) pleasure in the good, (ii) 
displeasure in the good, (iii) pleasure in the bad, (iv) displeasure in the bad, (v) indifference in the 
good, (vi) indifference in the bad. He also notes that Schadenfreude (taking pleasure in suffering) and 
amorality are instances of organic unities. The former has a good part but is evil on the whole. The 
latter has an indifferent part but is evil on the whole. Still, Lemos’s claims might be questionable. 
Does my righteous indignation at a person being tortured form an organic whole that is good? 
Possibly since the value of the parts do not determine the value of the whole, but such a claim 
might strike some as strange and lead them to reject Lemos’s suggestion. 
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of a means. The value of a means may change depending on the end to which it is 
connected. Third, the value of the whole cannot be transmitted to the part. This 
claim is not true of a means, whose value may change depending on 
circumstances. A means sometimes does and sometimes does not lead to a good 
end. One is justified in saying that it is good that some things exist under certain 
circumstances if they lead to a greater whole. Because of these differences, one 
must be careful to distinguish the concept of organic wholes from the concept of 
means and ends. 
Moore expands on this claim while rejecting other understandings of the 
principle of organic unities. As Moore states, there have been different senses of 
the term “organic whole”: (1) each parts is related to the others and to itself as 
means to an end as in a mutual dependence relation; (2) they have a property 
described as they have no meaning apart from the whole; (3) a value property 
belonging to a whole in the sense that Moore defines it. These definitions are not 
identical, Moore claims. Using the body as an example, Moore argues that one can 
see that there are certain parts of the body such that the continued existence of the 
one is a necessary condition of the continued existence of the other, and vice versa. 
This relation is a relation of mutual dependence. Each part is both the means and 
the end to the other parts, all the parts are means to the whole, and the whole is the 
means to the parts. Moore objects to this application stating that it is possible that 
none of the parts of such a dependence relation may have intrinsic value. In fact, 
one part may have value while another lacks it. As a result, these parts are only an 
“end” where such a term implies “effect.” The relation between part and whole, 
however, is different from the relation between part and part. The latter relation 
implies causal connection: the one cannot exist without the other. The former 
relation does not imply causal connection, and the relation may exit even if the 
parts are not causally connected. Further, the whole cannot be an end for the parts 
since the whole logically cannot exist without the parts, and the parts are not the 
cause of the whole since the parts are necessary and cannot cause themselves. As a 
result, such a mutual dependence relation implies nothing of the value of the 
objects that have it, and even if those objects have value, this relation cannot hold 
between part and whole. Mutual dependence is a false definition of organic unity.  
Another understanding of an organic unity Moore claims is that the parts 
possess a property which the parts of no whole can have. Just as the whole cannot 
be what it is without the parts, the parts cannot be what they are without the 
existence of the whole. The part is no distinct object of thought; therefore, the 
whole to which it belongs is part of the understanding of the part. Part and whole 
are tautologies. Moore claims that such a notion is false. No part analytically 
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contains the whole to which it belongs or any other parts of that whole. The 
relation of part to whole is not the same as whole to part. The relation of whole to 
part does analytically contain the part. The part is part of the whole, but it cannot 
be asserted that the whole is a part of itself. The claim this is a part of that whole has 
a specific meaning such that both subject and predicate must have different 
meanings, not the same. Therefore, the claim that the part cannot be understood or 
have meaning apart from the whole is incoherent and false.  
As a result, the best way to think of the principle of organic unities implies only 
that the value of the whole is different from the sum of the value of its parts. The 
principle does not imply causal connections between the parts or that the parts are 
inconceivable except as parts of the whole. Further, the principle does not imply 
that when the parts of one whole belong to a different whole that those parts now 
possess a different value than they originally had (Moore, 2004). Value is a 
property that belongs not just to the parts but to the whole. The value of the whole 
may be quite different from the sum of the value of the parts, and the value of the 
whole may be different from the value of individual parts. As the examples above 
demonstrate, there is good reason to believe that the principle of organic unities is 
true. 
 
2. The Logical Problem of Evil 
 
Having explained the principle of organic unities, we can now proceed to seeing 
how this principle affects the logical argument from evil. I contend that the 
principle of organic unities shows that the logical problem of evil ultimately fails. 
My argument against the logical problem of evil focuses on J. L. Mackie’s version 
(1971). Mackie argues that the existence of an omnipotent, wholly good God is 
logically incompatible with the existence of evil. His argument is written as 
follows: 
 
(11) God is omnipotent. 
(12) God is wholly good. 
(13) Evil exists.3 
 
Alvin Plantinga points out that this argument is not explicitly or formally 
contradictory (1977). Plantinga states that Mackie needs additional premises for his 
                                                 
3I have changed Mackie’s numbering so as to avoid confusion with the numbering of the 
premises in the evidential argument from evil.  
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argument to succeed, and Mackie implicitly provides these extra propositions with 
some modifications by Plantinga. As Plantinga states, they are: 
 
(19c) An omnipotent and omniscient good being eliminates every evil that it 
can properly eliminate. 
(20) There are no non logical limits to what an omnipotent being can do. 
(21) If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then he can properly eliminate 
every evil state of affairs.  
 
These propositions, when combined with (11), (12), and (13) produces the implicit 
contradiction that Mackie desires.  
Does Mackie’s argument succeed? While Plantinga offers his own argument for 
why Mackie’s argument fails, I argue that Mackie’s argument fails due to the 
combination of Mackie’s premises with the principle of organic unities. To see this 
claim, one must first draw some logical implications from Mackie’s premises. From 
proposition (12), one may infer the following proposition. 
 
(22) It is logically possible for God to co–exist with anything that is good. 
 
If God is perfectly good, then God is able co–exist with anything that is good 
without any problems. As proposition (20) states, God’s power is limited only by 
the boundaries of logic, and there is nothing illogical about a divine being co–
existing with what is good. In fact, this is part of the crux of the logical problem of 
evil. The atheist objects to the idea that a perfectly good God would co–exist with 
evil; therefore, God can only co–exist with what is good. As a result, proposition 
(22) follows from Mackie’s premises. 
Having established this implication from Mackie’s premises, one is now in a 
position to see how the logical problem of evil falters. Consider the following 
proposition derived from the definition on organic unities. 
 
(23) It is logically possible to have an organic unity that is good on the whole 
and contains evil parts. 
 
As was demonstrated in the previous section, it is logically possible to have a good 
organic whole that contains evil parts. Some types of these organic unities are 
demonstrated in moral virtues, such as mercy, forgiveness, self–sacrifice, remorse, 
courage, and even justice. Each one of these virtues contains both good and evil 
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parts but is still good on the whole. If proposition (23) is true, then the following 
proposition may be logically inferred from the combination of (23) with (22). 
 
(24) It is logically possible for God to co–exist with an organic unity that is 
good on the whole and contains evil parts. 
 
Since these organic unities are logically possible and good, then there is nothing to 
prevent an omnipotent and perfectly good God from co–existing with them. They 
are completely compatible with the existence of God. These organic unities, 
however, have evil parts. Since God may co–exist with these organic unities, the 
following proposition is also true. 
 
(25) It is logically possible for God to co–exist with evil things. 
 
Since these organic unities contain evil parts and God is logically able to co–exist 
with the good organic unities that contain these parts, then God may also logically 
co–exist with the existence of evil things, namely the evil parts of the organic unity. 
Consequently, one final implication may be drawn from these premises 
showing that the logical problem of evil fails to succeed. From (25), the following 
proposition can be inferred.  
 
(26) God’s existence is logically compatible with the existence of evil. 
 
God may co–exist with that which is evil as was stated in (25); therefore, God’s 
existence is logically compatible with the existence of evil. This conclusion, 
however, is the exact opposite of what Mackie claims. Mackie claims that his 
premises demonstrate that the existence of God and evil are not logically 
compatible. God can properly eliminate all evil and must do so as a perfectly good 
being; however, his premises produce the opposite conclusion when combined 
with the principle of organic unities.  
As it stands, the logical problem of evil fails. Where then does the problem lie? 
The theist will argue that the problem lies with proposition (21). It is simply false 
that an omnipotent and omniscient being can and must properly eliminate every 
evil. The theist’s claim is proven by the truth of the principle of organic unities and 
the falsehood of the principle of summation. It is clear that the value of a whole 
cannot be determined by the sum of its parts. Any situation involving God and evil 
is an organic unity, and there are good organic unities that contain evil parts. 
Further, these unities cannot exist without their parts. Since it is possible that there 
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are good organic unities that contain evil parts and God is logically able to co–exist 
with these unities, then God is not required to eliminate all evil. He needs that evil 
to get the good whole. Not only may he exist alongside evil but if he eliminated the 
evil parts of these organic unities he would lose the good whole. Even if such 
organic unities should never exist, it is still true that God may co–exist with them 
and is not required to eliminate them. Thus, both evil and God may co–exist with 
each other. As a result, proposition (21) is false. 
How might the atheist respond to the threat that the principle of organic unities 
presents to the logical problem of evil? The atheist could attempt to deny 
proposition (23) and reject the possible existence of good organic unities that 
contain bad parts. If no such unities are possible, then it is not possible that God 
co–exist with such unities. This move would require the atheist to demonstrate that 
such unities are not logically possible; however, there is very good reason to 
believe that such unities are logically possible. As was shown, states of affairs that 
involve mercy, courage, and self–sacrifice are all good organic unities that contain 
evil parts. Even more mundane states of affairs like farming and hunting are 
instances of such unities. Farming involves good parts (human beings, plants) as 
well as evil parts (the death and destruction of plant life). Even though unities such 
as farming contain evil parts, these unities are intrinsically good on the whole. In 
fact, God’s elimination of evil is itself a good organic unity with evil parts; 
therefore, there is good reason to believe that good organic unities that contain evil 
parts are not only logically possible but also actual and that the atheist is 
committed to their existence. Thus, the rejection of proposition (23) is not available 
to the atheist.  
Another potential move for the atheist is to argue that there is no such thing as 
evil. While this move may seem strange at first, it cannot be denied that some 
philosophers have argued for moral relativism, which denies the existence of 
objective morality. If there is no objective morality, then there can be no objective 
moral value. Consequently, what is called evil cannot actually be evil nor can 
anything else that may possibly exist. Notions of good and evil are opinions 
relative to the individual; therefore, the atheist need not worry about God’s 
existence being logically compatible with what is evil if relativism is true. This 
move, however, completely undermines the logical problem of evil. The entire 
problem is predicated on the notion that there is something that is actually evil in 
the world that God may not exist alongside. Without the notion of objective 
morality and objective moral value, all notions of evil are merely the opinions of 
individuals, and such opinions can have no logical force against another 
individual, like God. Such a move is not available to the atheist. 
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The only move left for the atheist in order to save the logical problem of evil is 
to reject proposition (22). The atheist could claim that it is false that a perfectly 
good God can co–exist with anything that is good. God can only co–exist with some 
things that are good, and good organic unities with evil parts are not on the list of 
things that God may exist alongside. As a result, the atheist need not worry about 
God co–existing with such organic unities that have evil parts. Unfortunately, this 
argument has troubling consequences. First, good organic unities with evil parts 
would be rendered immoral and evil on the whole. If these organic unities are 
logically possible, then the only reason that God could not co–exist with them 
would be because they violate the divine perfect goodness. As a result, such 
organic unities must be immoral and evil on the whole instead of good. Such a 
claim is patently inconsistent with the claims of the principle of organic unities. As 
the principle state, it is quite possible to have unities that are good on the whole 
and contain evil parts. One cannot conclude that an organic unity is evil on the 
whole simply because it contains evil parts. There are no logical grounds on which 
to make this conclusion, and there are many examples against such a claim. 
Second, many virtues would be rendered vices. For example, being courageous 
must be considered vicious since the organic unity that is courage contains both 
good parts (the agent, his righteous attitude) and evil parts (some danger or 
suffering to face). Similarly, justice would also be vicious since it involves 
rectifying through punishment an evil injustice which has occurred. The same is 
true as well with virtues, such as mercy, forgiveness, remorse, and self–sacrifice. 
As a result, no one (not even God) could express these virtues for they are actually 
vicious. Anyone who expressed these virtues would be immoral since he would be 
violating morality by doing what is evil. Such a conclusion is false for these moral 
virtues are foundational to the concept of morality. Third, the atheist’s claim that 
God can properly eliminate all evil would be false since this claim outlines a good 
organic unity (God’s elimination of evil) that contains an evil part (the evil to be 
eliminated). As a result, God could not properly eliminate any evil since to do so 
would be to bring about an organic unity that contains evil parts and is 
inconsistent with the divine goodness. Thus, the logical problem of evil would 
undermine itself. God both can and cannot properly eliminate all evil, which is 
false. God cannot be required to do both nor faulted for failing to do what is 
logically impossible.  
Since none of these potential moves is available to the atheist, the atheist has no 
means by which to reject the logical implication that the existence of God and evil 
is logically compatible due to the logical possibility of good organic unities that 
contain evil parts. An omnipotent and perfectly good God may co–exist with such 
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unities and thus may co–exist with evil. As a result, proposition (21) must be false. 
It is the only way to remove the inconsistency of combining Mackie’s argument 
with organic unities. Since an omnipotent and perfectly good God may co–exist 
with evil, it cannot be true that such a God can and must properly eliminate all 
evil. Thus, the principle of organic unities demonstrates that the logical problem of 
evil presented by Mackie is spurious. 
Mackie, however, might dispute this conclusion by comparing the principle of 
organic unities to what he considers to be fallacious responses to his argument. 
Mackie considers the idea that evil is necessary as a means to good to be such a 
response. If God must use the evil to get the good, then God is either not really 
omnipotent or omnipotence is being redefined.  Mackie also considers the claim 
that the universe is better with some evil in it than without that evil problematic as 
well. According to Mackie, one is claiming that out of the combination of some 
first–order evil with some first–order good emerges a second–order good, and this 
second–order good is more important because it outweighs the first–order evil. 
Mackie thinks that ultimately this argument fails for two reasons. First, God would 
only be concerned with promoting good and not minimizing evil, which might 
concern some theists. Second, it could be claimed that second–order evils that 
outweigh first–order goods are possible. As a result, the logical problem simply re–
emerges at a higher level and one is off to an infinite regress of higher–level goods 
and evils. Are not these fallacious responses what the principle of organic unities is 
claiming? 
Mackie’s criticisms, however, do not succeed. First, the principle of organic 
unities rejects the notion that evil parts are a means to a good whole. The value of 
the whole is not determined by such a relationship but is intrinsically held. Second, 
the principle of organic unities does not imply that second–order goods are more 
important because they outweigh first–order evils. The principle only implies that 
the intrinsic value of the whole is not equated with a summation of the parts. A 
second–order good is more important than first–order evils only in the sense that 
the whole consists of the parts and is what unites the parts together in a kind of 
ontological priority. Further, the claim of an infinite regress of higher goods and 
evils is false. The hierarchy of organic unities terminates with the whole of all 
reality, whatever that may be, because that is the highest–level organic unity. The 
question for Mackie then is whether or not the whole of all reality is evil such that 
God cannot exist. Theists, however, include God in the whole of all reality which 
would make reality not evil on the whole. As a result, whether or not the whole of 
all reality is evil depends on whether or not God exists which depends on the 
existence of evil making this potential response circular. Third, it is false that the 
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principle of organic unities would make God uninterested in minimizing evil. 
Minimizing evil is one way of promoting good, but God is not required to always 
minimize evil to promote the good as the principle of organic unities demonstrates.  
A benefit of the argument from organic unities against the logical problem of 
evil is that it presents the theist with an alternative to Plantinga’s modal free will 
defense. In some ways, Plantinga’s argument depends on the notion of organic 
unities to make its case implying that the argument from organic unities is more 
foundational. Possible worlds are organic unities that contain good and evil parts. 
When Plantinga states that God creates a world that contains evil and has good 
reason for creating that world, Plantinga is essentially arguing that such a world is 
an organic unity with evil parts and that the goodness of this unity is a partial 
reason why God choose to create it since a good God cannot create any evil world 
(Plantinga, 1977). The argument from organic unities, however, differs in many 
ways from what Plantinga offers in his argument.  
First, Plantinga appeals solely to the organic unities of possible worlds in his 
argument; however, proposition (23) allows the theist to appeal to any logically 
possible or actual organic unity that is good on the whole and contain evil parts. It 
is not just good possible worlds that contain evil which God’s existence is 
compatible with but also any organic whole that is good on the whole and contains 
evil. The theist need not get bogged down in arguments over the logically 
possibility of certain sets of possible worlds that meet certain conditions from 
which God may choose. He can simply point to less complex organic unities in 
possible worlds or in the actual world that are good on the whole but contain evil 
parts to make the argument work.  
Second, Plantinga’s argument relies on the logical possibility of human 
libertarian freedom and trans–world depravity. The argument from organic unities 
need not appeal to either of these concepts. There are possible organic unities that 
are good on the whole and contain evil parts that do not involve human libertarian 
freedom or the depravity of an agent. Further, such organic unities allow for a 
broader set of possible worlds from which God may choose. Instead of God only 
being able to choose between worlds that contain human libertarian freedom and 
trans–world depravity, the supporter of organic unities can argue that God has 
access to good worlds that do not contain these parts. So long as the organic unity 
is good, it is consistent with God’s existence regardless of the parts the unity 
contains.  
Third, the argument from organic unities is simpler and more elegant than what 
Plantinga offers because it avoids the complex issues previously mentioned. One 
does not need to concern himself with the logical possibility of certain sets of 
ORGANIC UNITIES 
13 
 
possible worlds from which God may choose, the logical possibility of human 
libertarian freedom, or the logical possibility of trans–world depravity. All that 
matters is that it is logically possible for an organic unity to be good on the whole 
and contain evil parts. The specificity of the parts that make up the organic unity is 
ultimately irrelevant to the argument from organic unities. As a result, the theist is 
not forced to appeal solely to Plantinga’s free will defense in order to escape the 
logical problem of evil. He has another route of escape should he disagree with 
Plantinga’s concepts. 
 
3. The Evidential Problem of Evil 
 
Let’s look now at how the principle of organic unities affects the evidential 
argument from evil. As developed by William Rowe (1996), the evidential 
argument from evil states the following: 
 
(1) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient 
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or 
permitting some evil equally bad or worse.  
(2) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any 
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing 
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
(3) There does not exist and omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. 
 
Richard Swinburne (1998) provides another more in–depth version of the 
evidential argument. It is as follows:  
 
(4) If there is a God, he is omnipotent and perfectly good. 
(5) A perfectly good being will never allow any morally bad state E to occur if 
he can prevent it, unless (i) allowing E to occur is something he has a right to 
do, (ii) allowing E (or a state of affairs as bad or worse) to occur is the only 
morally permissible way in which he can make possible the occurrence of a 
good state of affairs G, (iii) he does all else that he can to bring about G, and 
(iv) the expected value of allowing E, given (iii) is positive. 
(6) An omnipotent being can prevent the occurrence of all morally bad states. 
(7) There is at least one morally bad state of affairs e which is such that either 
God does not have a right to allow e to occur, or there is no good state g, such 
that allowing e (or a state at least equally bad) to occur is the only morally 
permissible way in which God can make possible the occurrence of g, that 
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God does all else that he can to bring about g, and that, given the latter, the 
expected value of allowing e is positive. 
So : There is no God.4 
 
In both arguments, the evidential problem from evil claims that the existence of a 
certain type of evil (gratuitous and pointless evil) provides a rational reason for 
denying the existence of God. God’s existence is compatible with some evils, but 
not gratuitous and pointless ones. God either has no right to allow this evil to exist, 
has no good state of affairs that this evil is necessary to achieve, has other means 
for obtaining that good state of affairs without the evil, or the state of affairs 
obtained by allowing this evil is not actually good. Rowe’s famous example of the 
fawn caught in the forest fire is supposed to serve as rational evidence (not logical 
proof) that such evils do exist and justify the atheist in his unbelief.  
Traditionally, the critical premise has been considered to be premise (1) of 
Rowe’s argument, which corresponds to premise (7) of Swinburne’s argument. If 
such instances of gratuitous and pointless suffering do not exist, then the 
evidential argument fails. Using the principle of organic unities, the theist can 
defend his position by claiming that the atheist in fact has no evidence to warrant 
his acceptance of premise (1), and the argument fails. As the principle states, 
organic wholes can be good while containing evil parts. As a result, organic unities 
of supposed gratuitous and pointless suffering, like the example of the fawn, could 
actually be good on the whole. The evil parts of this whole could fit together in 
such a way that the whole they form is actually good. If these states of affairs are 
good on the whole, then they do not count as gratuitous and pointless evils. In fact, 
they would not count as evils at all since they are good. Further, the atheist cannot 
point to the evil parts present in the whole and conclude that the whole is also evil. 
Neither the evil parts nor all of the parts together necessarily provide reason to 
believe that the whole is evil. The probability that the whole is evil is downgraded 
such that the atheist cannot tell whether the whole is evil or good. Since wholes 
with a majority of evil parts and wholes with nothing but bad parts can both be 
good, one cannot conclude that a whole is more likely to be evil than good. It could 
go either way. Nor is it apparent that wholes with evil parts or a majority of evil 
parts are preponderantly evil rather than good. How could the atheist ever 
demonstrate such a claim since he has no access to all of the organic unities that 
have been in existence much less those unities that contain evil parts?  
                                                 
4I have changed the numbering of Swinburne’s argument so as not to confuse with the 
numbering in Rowe’s argument.  
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Thus, the theist can argue that supposed unities of gratuitous and pointless evil 
are not actually evil on the whole. The evil is a part of a whole along with other 
objects and is necessary to the existence of that whole. Further, the whole’s value 
cannot be determined via the principle of summation since summation is not a 
valid way to determine the value of a whole. Any supposed existence of gratuitous 
evil, therefore, is an organic unity whose value is not determined by the value of 
the parts. They can actually be good on the whole. The theist does not need to 
understand what God’s purposes are for these unities or know what greater goods 
might be obtained by the organic whole in question as Rowe claims. As long as the 
whole in question is good, it is not a gratuitous and pointless evil and is 
compatible with God’s existence. If these supposed instances of gratuitous evil are 
actually good, the evidential argument would collapse. The theist can argue that 
God would ensure that that there were no instances of gratuitous and pointlessly 
evil organic unities, and this truth provides reason to reject premise (1). Further, 
the theist can argue that the atheist has no rational means to assert that any 
particular whole is gratuitous and pointlessly evil. He simply lacks warrant to 
make such a conclusion. The atheist has no means to sufficiently establish his claim 
causing the argument to fail.  
The theist, however, need not make this move. He need not argue over whether 
organic unities are good or evil on the whole. The theist can point out that each 
part of an organic unity contributes to the existence of the organic unity. The unity 
simply cannot exist without the part. Consequently, the evil parts have a purpose 
within the whole and are not pointless even if the parts are evil. It is tempting to 
conclude that though the whole might not be a gratuitous and pointless evil the 
parts are; however, this conclusion is simply not the case. The parts themselves 
cannot be considered gratuitous and pointless evil because of the purpose they 
play in constituting the whole. No whole can exist without its parts. Such a 
relationship gives purpose to the parts that function to form the whole.  
Further, the theist can point out that organic unities are hierarchical. Organic 
unities are comprised of parts, and organic unities can be parts for larger, more 
complex organic unities. For example, an instance of courage on the battlefield is 
an organic unity that is itself a part of a larger, more complex organic unity: the 
battle itself. As a result, the organic unity of the soldier’s courage fits within the 
larger, more complex organic unity of the battle and contributes to the existence of 
the battle. Thus, the less complex organic unity has purpose within the more 
complex organic unity as the less complex unity is necessary for the existence of 
the more complex unity. The same is true of instances of supposed gratuitous and 
pointless evils like the fawn. Organic unities like these are themselves parts of 
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larger, more complex organic unities; therefore, they have a purpose within the 
existence of the more complex organic unity. Consequently, these supposedly 
gratuitous and pointlessly evil organic unites have purpose after all even if they 
are evil. As a result, the theist can maintain that such organic unities like the 
instance of the fawn are evil yet not gratuitous and pointless due to their position 
in the hierarchy of unities as parts of higher–level wholes. As a result, the theist 
can argue that the atheist’s evidence against God’s existence does not count as 
evidence at all. The theist, therefore, may claim that he has rational warrant for 
believing that there are no gratuitous and pointless evils either in the parts or the 
wholes due to the principle of organic unities and that the atheist’s appeal to 
rational warrant is incorrect.  
The atheist may object here. He might admit that there are no gratuitous and 
pointless evils in the parts, and he may admit that no lower–level organic unity is 
gratuitously and pointlessly evil. Is it not possible, however, that the highest–level 
organic unity is gratuitously and pointlessly evil? Cannot the evidential argument 
be saved by arguing that God could and would have prevented the highest–level 
organic unity from existing but has not? This argument depends on how one 
understands what the highest–level organic unity is. The theist will certainly argue 
that the highest–level organic unity is the combination of the natural world with all 
supernatural entities. God’s existence is just as much a part of the highest–level 
organic unity as is the natural world and will make the highest–level organic unity 
good. The atheist is sure to object to the inclusion of God as a part of the highest–
level organic unity. Only natural entities can comprise the highest–level organic 
unity since there is no God. Consequently, the natural world is the highest–level 
organic unity.   
Here again the atheist runs into trouble. In order to justify his atheism, the 
atheist must appeal to the existence of gratuitous and pointless evil. The only 
gratuitous and pointless evil possible given the argument from organic unities is 
the highest–level organic unity, and the atheist’s understanding of the highest–
level organic unity already implies the truth of atheism. The argument is circular 
and unusable. The atheist cannot use the evidential argument from evil combined 
with the principle of organic unities without already assuming his conclusion. He 
cannot determine that the natural world is a gratuitously evil organic unity devoid 
of God without assuming the non–existence of God. The atheist will have to argue 
for God’s non–existence on other grounds than gratuitous evil. As a result of the 
principle of organic unities, the atheist has no rational warrant for his disbelief 
based on gratuitous evil. All evil parts have purpose within the wholes they 
instantiate, all lower–level organic unities have purpose within the higher–level 
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organic unities they instantiate, and the atheist’s definition of the highest organic 
unity assumes the position for which he is attempting to argue. Even if the 
highest–level organic unity is reduced to the natural world, the theist will claim 
that God would not create a gratuitous and pointlessly evil world. As a result, 
there is no reason to believe that the natural world is gratuitously evil without 
assuming atheism in the first place. Further, one cannot presume that the natural 
world is evil at all if atheism is true. The natural world might still be good on the 
whole due to the principle of organic unities. There is simply no means for the 
atheist to demonstrate his case. 
As a result, the theist will conclude that premise (1) is unwarranted due to the 
principle of organic unities, and the argument fails. The atheist cannot demonstrate 
that any instance of gratuitous and pointless evil is actually gratuitous and 
pointless due to the purpose that any instance of evil plays in the hierarchy of 
organic unities. The evidential argument is insufficient to establish the atheist’s 
claim. In fact, there can be no instance of gratuitous evil unless one assumes 
atheism. Any rational appeal by the atheist against this claim leads to a circular 
argument forcing the atheist to argue for his disbelief in God on other grounds 
than gratuitous evil. Further, the argument from organic unities demonstrates that 
God does have a right to being about a supposed gratuitous and pointless evil 
because that evil is part of a good organic unity, and that unity is not possible to 
obtain without the evil in question. The evil, therefore, cannot be gratuitous and 
pointless as it serves a purpose. Lastly, the value of these organic unities is 
expected to be positive given the hierarchy of unities, the purpose laden within it, 
and the existence of God. The atheist, consequently, lacks warrant for his disbelief 
from the appeal to gratuitous evil alone, and the evidential argument from evil 
fails. 
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